Coordination occurs when 2 or more people do the same or complementary tasks at the same time; it takes several forms. The form of coordination studied here was similar to behavior at a 4-way stop traffic intersection. The performance task involved 12 4-person groups and a special card game. Split-plot analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that coordination rules were implicitly learned and then transferred successfully to new rules of similar difficulty and that coordination can occur without verbal mediation or leadership actions. Transfer of coordination was less positive to a task of greater difficulty. Nonlinear regression showed that fixed-point attractors could be extracted from all learning curves. The difficult shift contained a second chaotic process and a critical utility threshold at which the difficult rule could be mastered or not.
Work-group effectiveness has been studied from a variety of perspectives; central themes have included cooperation, cohesion, incentives, task structure, size, and leadership attributes. In this project we focused on the dynamics of group coordination and traced its conceptual origins; here we report new theory, an experiment, and analytic techniques that explore the origins of coordination in groups. Coordination occurs when two or more people do the same or complementary tasks at the same time. Coordination is vital to group effectiveness in situations where a successful outcome for the entire group is the end result of numerous contributions or efforts by all group members and where successful contributions by one participant are contingent on a correct and timely contribution by another participant.
Coordination among team members has been recognized as an important correlate of team performance (Bowers, Baker, & Salas, 1994; Brannick, Prince, Prince, & Salas, 1995; Brannick, Roach, & Salas, 1993; Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, Salas, & Volpe, 1995; Coovert, Campbell, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1995; Daily, 1980; Leedom & Simon, 1995; Stout, Salas, & Carson, 1994) . Coordination has been operationalized Stephen J. Guastello, Department of Psychology, Marquette University; Denise D. Guastello, Department of Psychology, Carroll College. We wish to acknowledge Nicole H. Gem& for meritorious research assistance.
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variously by observer ratings of communication patterns (Brannick et al., 1993; Daily, 1980) or negatively by the amount of time one team member spends waiting for another before engaging in a joint effort (Coovert et al., 1995) . So far, these measures of coordination have been inconsistently linked to group performance in simulated situations. It is now possible, however, to apply job analysis ratings to work situations to discern the extent to which coordination is required (Bowers et al., 1994) .
Group cohesion has received some attention as a possible catalyst for team coordination. Group cohesion is the sum of forces acting on group members that maintain their participation in the group, such as cooperation and help giving, mutual psychological support, interpersonal attraction, commitment to the task, and group pride (Mullen & Copper, 1994; Zander, 1994) . Meta-analyses of empirical studies concur that cohesion is an important contributor to effective group performance (Evans & Dion, 1991; Mullen & Copper, 1994) . There is, however, no support for the moderator hypothesis that "a greater degree of interaction would indicate that cohesiveness exerts its effects on performance by improving coordination among group members and thereby enhancing smooth operation of the group as a system" (Mullen & Copper, 1994, p. 213 ; see also Leedom & Simon, 1995) .
Although communication and waiting time may be symptomatic of coordination, there is reason to believe, based on the game theory and nonlinear dynamics systems (NDS) literatures, that the coordination phenomenon has not yet been fully isolated. The model of coordination adopted in this study contains several unique premises.
The theoretical principles are expanded below. The empirical study that follows is organized in three phases. The first is a coordination-learning experiment that was designed to isolate the desired form of coordination from other social processes and examined the transfer of coordination learning to similar and more difficult situations; the pertinent hypotheses and data analysis were relatively conventional. In the second phase of the analysis, nonlinear dynamical functions were extracted and compared against theoretical expectations. In the third phase, the functions were explored in simulation form to discern the presence of critical points at which coordination is likely to occur.
Game Theory
Game theory is a formal mathematical approach to economic behavior for two or more economic agents and the cognitive aspects of social interaction (yon Neumann & Morgenstem, 1953; Zagare, 1984) . Gaming experiments commonly manipulate the motivational and payoff structures available to players for their selection of options
Stag Hunt and Social Loafing
In a strictly cooperative coordination game, the outcome for the group is dependent on the efforts of all members. If one member makes too little effort, or too many mistakes, the outcome for the group is reduced to that of the least effective person (Crawford, 1991; McCain, 1992) . In Stag Hunt, all players are working toward a common goal and share a common reward if the goal is attained. Players assume the role of a hunter in a group that is trying to surround a stag. If one hunter does not respond adequately, the stag has an opening through which to slip to evade the hunter group, and no one obtains a reward.
The social loafing phenomenon is essentially a game of Stag Hunt. Social loafing occurs when a group is supposed to be working for a common outcome; the rewards are shared by all the participants, but some people work much harder than others (Albanese & Van Fleet, 1985; Latanr, Williams, & Harkins, 1979) . "The social loafer, like the free rider, profits from the work of other group members without working up to his or her level of potential" (Comer, 1995, p. 649) . When inequities are experienced, the best workers become dissatisfied and remove themselves from such a situation if possible, particularly if the group is perceived to be functioning poorly overall (Comer, 1995) .
Social loafing is likely to occur when the group is large and when each group member does not have a personal, definable role to play in the group. Under those conditions, the contribution of a single person is seen as small, and unimportant. "Why bother? What difference does it make?" One recommended antidote for loafing is to segment the group into relatively small units. Larger groups exhibit lower cohesion and are less well coordinated by people in coordinating roles. Alternatively, one may introduce more coordinator roles or define tasks in a way that permits individual roles, responsibilities, and contributions to overall group-performance objectives at the same time. Increased individual accountability might ensure a more equal distribution of group labor (Albanese & Van Fleet, 1985) .
Not all examples of differential participation from group members are examples of loafing, however. For instance, suboptimal group effectiveness may arise from inappropriate task and reward structures (Shepperd, 1993) or from personality characteristics that are antithetical to working in groups on a continuing basis (Earley, 1989 (Earley, , 1993 Guastello, 1995) . More to the point, inferior group performance with differential input by individuals can arise, in our view, from poorly synchronized efforts of the group as a whole. Thus, the coordination phenomenon is a group-level dynamic that is not adequately characterized as a simple sum of individual inputs.
Intersection
Intersection games resemble the behavior of automobile drivers when they approach a four-way stop situation. If the drivers perceive the correct turn-taking system adopted by the preceding drivers and follow the sequence, then all cars pass through the intersection in a minimum amount of time with the lowest odds of a collision. In a real-life intersection, any of several possible rule systems could be adopted by the drivers. Each driver approaching the intersection needs to observe the strategy that is actually in effect (Crawford, 1991) and then makes the correct action. If the correct action is not made, an accident could occur, or at the very least, other players would need to revert to ad-lib actions to untangle the confusion at the intersection.
The Intersection form of coordination is predicated on individuals learning the rules of successful sequential interaction. Learning requires effort, as in the case of Stag Hunt, but input of effort is not sufficient in this case. The coordination of players is not localized into a separate coordinator role. Rather, the responsibility of coordination is distributed among all players. Players learn not only the task but also the awareness of how other players' input affects their next actions.
Coordination in the sense of Intersection games appears to explain group-performance phenomena such as the improvisational flurries of a jazz band or theater group. Here the script, chart, or task is sufficiently structured so that players know what piece they are performing and where they are in the unfolding of the piece. At the same time, there are spontaneous elements that emerge whereby each performer makes a simultaneous or subsequent contribution that enhances, develops, or supports the contributions of particular soloists.
Knowing the rules of baseball, football, soccer, basketball, lacrosse, or other team sports is only the beginning of what it takes for a team to be effective. Excellence in elementary skills such as running, passing, catching, shooting baskets or goals, or subverting the actions of opposition players is also necessary but insufficient. Coordination among players constitutes a good deal of what remains.
Intersection-type coordination also appears to aptly describe the health care services provided by hospitals to inpatients. Physicians, nurses, and technicians of different specialties need to provide the right actions in the right sequence for a regular flow of patients who have individual requirements. There are additional interactions among physicians, nurses, housekeeping and dietary staff, and whoever is responsible for scheduling people, events, and physical facilities. Successful care delivery is related to timeliness and synchrony as well as it is to individuals' skills.
Utilities, Equilibria, and Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
A game can be formalized as a matrix of utilities, showing the options available to each player on each axis of the matrix. Table 1 lists the options and utilities for the Intersection game actually played in the experiment that is reported here. The utilities of a particular pair of options are listed in each cell of the matrix for each player, separated by a comma. The game was composed of four players, and the options in the table are listed for one player compared with the collective action of the remaining three. Partial coordination occurred when three out of four players illustrated that they had figured out the game rule. The utilities for the individual and the group were the same, and a fully coordinated action was preferable to all players. These utilities were translated into the performance scoring and feedback system used in the ensuing experiment.
In any game matrix, there is at least one equilibrium combination of plays to which the players gravitate (Nash, 1951) . There may be single fixed points, or multiple equilibria. If there are multiple Nash equilibria within a game, one or more may be evolutionarily stable as the result of repeated long-term interactions among many players. Although there is no guarantee of evolutionary stability from a set of gaming utilities, it is closely tied to the Nash equilibria when it exists (Crawford, 1991; Maynard Smith, 1982) .
Evolutionarily stable strategies have been studied primarily in the context of Prisoners' Dilemma games where players have the option of cooperating with their partners, in which case both partners receive the same desirable The limitation of strictly computerized iterated games is, however, that they assume strict rationality on the part of real people as defined in the game matrix. The approach taken in this study, in contrast, was to conduct an experiment involving real people for a short iterated game series, after which the dynamics were extrapolated empirically. The extracted functions, which summarize actual human behavior, were then subjected to simulations to explore additional questions regarding evolutionary stability.
Implicit Learning
Implicit learning is essentially an unconscious thinking process that is typically coupled with an explicit-learning set. Several types of unconscious learning sets that have been captured include artificial grammars and production management in a simulation of a sugar factory (Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Reber, Kassin, Lewis, & Cantor, 1980; Seger, 1994) . Participants would be trained in the explicitlearning objectives, then tested later on the implicit objectives. Knowledge of the implicit objectives was substantially greater than chance.
Implicit learning occurs to a greater or lesser extent compared with explicit learning depending on the salience of the information to be learned and the selectivity of the learner. In many natural conditions, an implicit rule will not be any less salient than explicit information; in those cases learning is less selective. In the case of salient targets, explicit instructions to learn an implicit rule (to experimental treatment participants) results in greater learning than that observed for control participants. In the case of a nonsalient target, there is less learning with the explicit instruction than that observed for control participants (Berry & Broadbent, 1988) .
Coordination learning (intersection type) has both explicit and implicit components. The explicit goal is to learn the rule by which a sequence of events should take place. The implicit goal is for team members to anticipate moves by their coworkers, read their timing signals, and execute a move at the right time and place. Therefore, it should be possible for a group to learn a coordination rule in one experimental set and then learn a second rule faster, assuming an equal level of rule difficulty, in a second experimental set. We examined this type of transfer explicitly in the ensuing experiment.
Not all coordination learning involves repeated interactions among the same players. In an actual four-way stop intersection, each driver has few repeated interactions with specific other drivers. Much of the explicit learning is derived from watching others. The implicit learning is the sum of experience with other drivers and intersections, coupled perhaps with some level of expectation that the other drivers will act reciprocally. Another part of the implicit learning is knowing what patterns a driver should look for when trying to figure out what rule is in motion. For instance, three common rules are two cars heading east-west alternating with two cars heading north-south, counterclockwise rotation, the car that arrived first passes through first, and the car on the right goes first (standard driver's manual rule). There are other conventions that drivers adopt when trying to make left turns; left turns through congested intersections are often made by two cars making a left turn approaching from opposite directions.
Although implicit learning explains coordination learning, coordination learning is not ordinary implicit learning because learners interact with other learners. In common learning experiments, individuals learn something from stimuli presented by the experimenter who controls the presentation of stimuli. In coordinated groups or teams, each participant provides stimuli and some sort of feedback for the others in addition to the feedback associated with the explicit task. All learners in a coordination situation must be successful to some extent if any are to claim the group reward.
Nonlinear Dynamics and Gaming
NDS is a hybrid of mathematical concepts concerning attractors, bifurcations, structural stabilities and instabilities, chaos, fractals, catastrophes, self-organizing processes, cellular automata, genetic algorithms, and other evolutionary processes. NDS offers original explanations and insights for organizational phenomena (Dooley, 1997; Goldstein, 1994; Guastello, 1995; Kiel, 1994) and other topics in psychology (e.g., Abraham & Gilgen, 1995; Robertson & Combs, 1995; Sulis & Combs, 1996; Vallacher & Nowak, 1994) . The principles most relevant to coordination games are considered here.
Attractors, Bifurcations, and Stability
Attractors are spatial structures that characterize the motion of points when they enter the space. Three common varieties are the fixed-point, periodic, and chaotic attractors. Collectively they represent specific varieties of constructs that were known in the past as equilibria. In the fixed-point attractor, a point may enter the space, and once it does, it remains at a fixed point. Other points that are indefinitely close to the epicenter of the attractor are pulled into the attractor space. Points traveling outside the boundaries or basin of the attractor are not pulled into the attractor region. Fixed-point functions are observed as time series showing changes of a system toward asymptotic upper or lower boundary, as in learning curves. Chaotic attractors are discussed below.
A bifurcation is a pattern of instability that is observed within a dynamical field. Bifurcations serve to split a dynamical field into local subregions occupied by separate dynamics. One common form, the logistic or Feigenbaum map, changes an attractor pattern from fixed, to periodic, to chaotic, as a value of a control parameter changes.
Another is observed in catastrophe models, whereby a dynamical field is divided among a pattern of attractor and repellor regions.
Patterns of instability are often observed in arc patterns. Arc patterns may intersect at hyperunstable points where the unpredictability of the system is greatest. Points that arrive arbitrarily close to each other in the neighborhood of a critical bifurcation point can exhibit dissimilar behavior after passing through the bifurcation point.
Chaos
A chaotic time series shows highly complex patterns with long repeat lengths. Although it appears random, it is the result of a relatively simple but nonrepeating function. Some of the more famous chaotic attractors are the result of three or more coupled equations, such that the output of one equation becomes the input for another. Furthermore, the function would be sensitive to initial conditions; if a small random shock were introduced into a time series (from outside the experimental situation, or outside the system of equations), the subsequent segment of the time series would be propelled into a new pattern that would not have otherwise occurred.
Not all chaotic functions are indicative of a chaotic attractor, however. A chaotic attractor exhibits two characteristics in addition to chaotic time series. The first is a structurally stable attractor basin. Even though the trajectories appear to be near random when viewed over time, all trajectories in the basin of an attractor are performing according to the same rules. There is also a clear but permeable boundary to the basin; points may enter if they veer close enough. When they do enter, they follow the same chaotic regimen as the other points already inside the attractor. A pattern of folding and expanding takes place within the chaotic attractor itself. Trajectories that travel too close to the epicenter are bounced outward. Trajectories that travel from within the attractor to the edge of the basin are pulled inside.
Self-Organization
Systems in a state of chaos, or far-from-equilibrium conditions, self-organize by building feedback loops among the subsystems thereby shaping their own structures. These feedback loops serve to control and stabilize the system in a state of lower entropy (Kauffman, 1993 (Kauffman, , 1995 Prigogine & Stengers, 1984) . Patterns of stimuli and responses can be interchangeably understood as communication flow patterns. In organizations, explicit policies and implicit cultural norms evolve to permit or require certain actions, facilitate (or catalyze) others, and inhibit yet others. Positive feedback loops facilitate growth, development, or radical change in the extreme. Negative feedback loops have the net impact of inhibiting organizational change. At times the policies of an organization, or the cognitive processes of a human individual, will contain illogical components that make no sense to an impartial outside observer. On closer inspection, however, they serve the purposes of inhibiting change or challenges to the internal relationships within the organization or logical system (Goertzel, 1994; Goldstein, 1994) . Reynolds (1987) developed an application of self-organization that explains the flocking behavior of birds, which is a nonhuman coordination phenomenon. The formarion and travel paths of flocks can be explained by a set of only three rules: (a) Avoid crowding or colliding with flockmates, (b) steer toward the average heading of the flockmates, and (c) stay close to the average location of the flockmates.
Bird flocks function without leaders or verbal mediation. Geese, although they fly in a characteristic V formation, do not have an actual leader. They take turns at the vertex and other positions. The role rotations represent another instance of coordination. Similar dynamics have been ascertained for schools of fish and animal herds. The key finding of relevance to human group coordination is that leadership or hierarchical structures are neither necessary nor sufficient for coordination.
Intersection-type coordination is closely analogous to the type of biophysical coordination that exists among human muscle groups. They too function by means of communication links and without hierarchy and (obviously) without verbal mediation (Saltzman, 1996; Turvey, 1990) . This pattern was speculated as an explanation for coordination among human social agents on at least one previous occasion (Baron, Amazeen, & Beck, 1994) .
Nonlinear Dynamics for Coordination Games
NDS affects group coordination in several ways. In game theory, applications of dynamical concepts are inherent in the notions of Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies. In more complex games, where the matrix of players and options is at least 4 × 4, chaotic dynamics can be observed as players shift strategies over the course of a game because of the local subgame strategies that emerge (Rand, 1978) . Strategy shifts can be chaotic GUASTELLOAND GUASTELLO in simple games, however (Richards, 1990) . Principles of game theory are now thought to play a large role in the self-organization of human institutions and in biological and social evolutionary processes because of the rational utility functions associated with cooperation outcomes and their relationship to evolutionarily stable strategies (Casti, 1995; Kauffman, 1995) .
There are also two aspects of NDS that are associated with the implicit-learning feature of coordination. Because coordination is believed to be a learned function, a group's coordination over time would increase toward a fixed-point attractor. Because it is a group-learning phenomenon with communication links among the group members, coordination is a self-organizational process. Difficult coordination tasks would promote the behavioral signs of chaos before self-organization and the attraction to the fixed point of asymptotic stability set in.
Hypotheses for a Coordination Experiment
Because the Intersection coordination game is not well studied in real human situations, the hypotheses for this study were elementary. Hypothesis 1 stated that coordination dynamics in the sense of a group process actually exist and that coordination is learned by the experimental participants in a novel situation in a manner that is not mediated by leadership functions or verbal communication.
Hypothesis 2 stated that groups learn to coordinate themselves in a self-organizing manner. There would be a transfer of coordination from one rule situation to the next. Thus, when experimental groups are moved from one task to a similar task with a different but equally difficult rule structure, the learning curve for the second coordination challenge would be sharper, and the overall learning greater, than in the first learning curve.
Hypothesis 3 stated that motivational conditions external to the gaming utilities can affect the learning of a coordinated response. More specifically, if some groups of players believed that their individual compensation for participating in the game would be contingent on their group's success, those groups would demonstrate more correct coordinated responses than they would in a condition where each player expects the same amount of compensation whether or not the group is collectively successful. This hypothesis, however, was a control for the effects of rewards external to the game utilities that might have been associated with the procedure for drafting participants.
Hypothesis 4 stated that the nonlinear functions extracted for coordination acquisition would represent fixedpoint attractors. Iterated nonlinear dynamical functions could be used to locate evolutionarily stable levels of coordination, thereby circumventing the assumption of complete rationality that typically appears in pure simulation approaches to evolutionarily stable state searches.
Hypothesis 5 stated that a difficult coordination transfer would produce different variations of the process in initial learning and transfer, in the form of bifurcation structures, chaos, or a second nonlinear dynamic process accompanying the primary fixed-point attractor.
Method

Participants
Participants were 48 college students, who were organized into 12 groups of 4 persons. Their ages ranged from 20 to 23 years. There were 10 men and 38 women. The number of men and women within the groups was not controlled.
Groups played a coordination game under two motivational conditions. In the first condition, ordinary class credit was awarded such that the amount of credit was based on participation time and was the same for all participants in this condition. In the second condition, participants were informed that their credit was predicated on the number of "maximum coordination" plays, which would indicate how well they performed as a group. During the debriefing after the experiment, however, the players in the variable reward condition were informed that "because they performed so well," they would receive the number of points the experimenters had already earmarked as the amount of credit given in the uniform-reward condition.
The Game Procedure
The coordination game took the form of a card game for 4 players. Each player was dealt five cards: 10-J-Q-K-A. Each player had cards in a separate suit. The suit was of no importance to the plays they made; suits served only to identify the cards with the players. Players were informed that they each had a different suit and should keep the same suit for each hand of cards that they played throughout the experiment. Players held their cards so as not to show their hands to other players as the game progressed.
Players did not talk to each other about the plays that had been made or that they should make. Nonverbal gesturing was not specifically disallowed, however. The prohibition against talking is common in game-theory experiments to prevent discussions from altering the utilities associated with the gaming options and from slanting the expectations from other players. Additionally, if learning did occur during the course of the game, it could be assessed in finer increments by observing performance on the task more often and allowing discussion to mediate the process less.
The experimental groups were leaderless in order to prevent the structuring behaviors of leaders from contaminating the coordination effect. Groups were composed of players who had no prior work history together so as to minimize cohesion effects.
The goal of the game was for the team of players to play a series of cards in increasing value (e.g., 10-J-Q-K or J-Q-K-A). Players were told that they needed to play their cards in a correct order, but they were not told the order. Indeed, a key feature of the game was for the group of four players to figure out the correct sequence. The play began with one player arbitrarily starting by placing a card face up on the gaming table, the next player selecting the next card in the series and playing it on the table accordingly, and so on until all 4 players had put down a card. After each play, players were told whether they had played a maximum point series or not; a maximum point series was worth "four game points." They were given partial reinforcement of "one game point" if the group had played three out of four cards correctly. There were, of course, two possible maximum point series that they could play in the first round.
Having been dealt their cards by the experimenter as discussed above, a group would make five sets of plays for the first hand in hopes of learning the correct sequence, beginning with a hand of five cards. They continued further plays with their remaining hands of four, three, two, and then one card. Cards were then picked up from the table, and the playing started over. A pilot testing of the procedure showed that eight hands of the card game were sufficient for the groups to attain coordination.
There were three rounds of the coordination game. After the first eight hands, participants were informed that the rules of the game had changed and that they needed to identify a new correct sequence. Once again, they were not told the correct sequence and had to figure it out for themselves. In the second round, the winning sequence was a descending series: A-K-Q-J-10. Again, after eight hands of play, they switched rules; this time the winning series was an inverted sequence: J-K-A-Q-10.
Scoring and Performance Measurement
The quality of each play was scored four points if all four cards appeared in a correct sequence, one point if three cards were played in the correct sequence, and zero points otherwise. There were two possible correct sequences of four cards in each round. Scores were then added together to form a score for each hand. The assignment of zero points reflected the outcome that coordination was not achieved. The assignment of one point was intended to reflect partial learning but with the smallest amount of nonzero credit; there were three possible one-point outcomes in each round.
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA ) Experimental Design
The experimental design was a split-plot ANOVA with two factors repeated and one between-subjects factor. One repeated measure was the change in rules or rounds of the game, which contained three levels of the factor. The second repeated measure was the hand of the game within the round, for which there were eight levels. This factor lent itself to an assessment of the learning curves for coordination acquisition. The betweensubjects factor was motivational condition, which contained two levels: individual rewards based on time spent and group rewards based on quality. ANOVA was calculated using the unique sums-of-squares method for multiple repeated measures.
Assessment of Nonlinear Dynamics
The performance histories for the 12 groups were subjected to exponential nonlinear regression (ENR) analysis to extract separate functions for Rounds 1, 2, and 3. ENR is elaborated below as a method for testing for chaos, dimensionality, and fixed-point dynamics.
Fractals and dimensionality.
A fractal is a geometric structure that contains a noninteger number of dimensions. Fractals are repeating self-similar structures that are hierarchically embedded in themselves. A fractal's dimension of a structure can be measured and interpreted geometrically. The basin of a chaotic attractor is a fractal, which means that the complexity of a chaotic process can be characterized by a measure of fractal dimension.
Although chaotic attractors have fractal basins, a fractional dimensionality is not a test for chaos. For that purpose Lyapunov dimensionalities (DL) are preferred. A positive value indicates an expanding chaotic function, and a negative value indicates nonchaotic behavior. The absolute value of DE indicates the level of complexity inherent in a function. Dimensionality for dynamics of interest here would be relatively low (e.g., less than 4.0) and most likely fractional. DE is related to topological entropy (Ott, Sauer, & Yorke, 1994) , which is a variant of thermodynamic entropy. A recent statistical technique for extracting DL, the method of struqtural equations (Guastello, 1995) , is elaborated next.
Elementary ENR model The general autoregressive function is
where z is the time series variable of interest such that (1) where yl is the raw observation, h is a location parameter, and as is an estimate of scale. Location is commonly measured as the lowest value of the data series, although the mean of z might be used. Scale is variability around a mode, rather than about the mean, but is often estimated as variability around the mean. The resulting variable zi is calibrated in moments.
The simplest model in the exponential series, tested here, is z2 = e (elz'),
where 01 is a nonlinear regression parameter estimated empirically in the course of the analysis; 01 is also the Lyapunov number. If it is positive, then the function is expanding and chaotic. If it is negative, then the dynamics of the system are better characterized as fixed points or periodic functions, depending on their dimensionality. The Lyapunov dimension, DL, is
Equation 3 can be embellished by adding additional regression parameters for fit such as 01 and 03 in Equation 5; 03 is also a correction for location. Z2 = 01e (02zl) + 03.
Bifurcation hypothesized but unknown. The second model in the exponential series is the case where we have an unknown bifurcation variable. Here we test for the structure, but because we have neither a hypothesis as to what it could be nor data to
test it, we estimate the bifurcation variable 0~ as a regression parameter. z2 = 01zle e÷~ + 03.
In this case dimension is calculated as DL=e °2+ 1.
Goodness of fit and model interpretation. The R 2 coefficients associated with Equations 3, 5, and 6 are measures of goodness of fit. The difference ( 1 -R 2) is the variance associated with noise, error, or other deviations from the model. A comparison linear test is already built into the nonlinear regression model. If the regression parameter 0~ in Equation 3 or/92 in Equation 6 is not significant (i.e., zero) then the exponent of e is zero, and DE is 1.0, which is a line. Note, however, that the size of an estimated nonlinear regression parameter is not dependent on the size of the R 2, or semipartial r, as it is in ordinary linear regression. There are some heuristics for distinguishing some of the more common dynamical structures from ENR. The presence of a bifurcation structure (discussed above), lag effects, and multiple order parameters (not considered here) show up as structural ingredients in the modeling equations. A positive Lyapunov exponent indicates chaosticity. A fixed-point attractor would be indicated by a negative exponent parameter, such that 0 < e ° < 1. DE in the neighborhood of 121 suggests a single period of a cyclic behavior or a bifurcation arc. DE approaches 131 in the cases of repeated cycles or hysteresis. Chaosticity and cyclicity are not incompatible and would be denoted by a DL in the neighborhood of +3; in those cases a cyclic pattern would be occurring, but the cycle would not cover the same range and duration in each period (Guastello, 1996) . Functions with higher DL are more complex.
Three studies to date have reported comparisons between results obtained from ENR and alternative computations. DES obtained from ENR compared favorably with results from a nonstatistical algorithm for fractal dimensionality using standard data for chaotic attractors with known properties (Johnson & Dooley, 1996 ) . ENR produced the same (within .01 dimensions) measure of dimensionality as the inverse log (statistical) approach, and more accurately (R 2 criterion) captured a fixed-point attractor than a common alternative structural model (Guastello & Philippe, 1997) . Another line of research is concerned with whether ENR can produce a DL within .5 dimensions of that produced by a technique based on the mathematics of symbolic dynamics and information theory (Guastello, Hyde, & Odak, 1998) . Figure 1 displays the performance trends for the 12 groups over the course of eight hands of play. Trends for each round of the game are shown separately, and all trends are pooled over motivational conditions. In all three cases there was an irregular upward trend in performance as the game progressed. The accompanying descriptive statistics appear in Table 2 . The main effect for the eight hands of play was statistically significant (p < .001 ); the ANOVA details appear in Table 3 ; Hypothesis 1 was thus supported.
Results
Basic Experimental Design
The main effect for rounds of the game was also significant (p < .001 ). Follow-up tests using Takey's HSD method showed that all three means were different from each other at p < .01. There was a positive transfer of coordination learning from Round 1 to Round 2 where the game rules were equally difficult; Hypothesis 2 was thus supported. Transfer was incomplete in the transition to Round 3 where the game rule was more difficult. The interaction between round of the game and hands of play was not significant; thus the different irregular shapes of the learning curves were of no consequence.
The motivational manipulation showed no significant effect on performance, thus the coordination acquisition trends in Figure 1 were pooled over motivational conditions; Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Furthermore, there o #. were no significant interactions between motivational condition and hand of play, or between motivational condition and round of the game. The three-way interaction was not significant either. Finally, we calculated R 2 coefficients for the two significant main effects in order to obtain an assessment of their effect sizes. An R 2 of .12 was obtained for the maineffect hand, which indicated the amount of learning within one rule set. An additional 19% of variance was accounted for by the difference between rounds of the game wherein the coordination rules were changed. The value of .12 served as a benchmark against which to compare nonlinear regression models for the same learning dynamics. The total variance accounted for by the two findings was 31%. An additional 8% of variance was associated with the nonsignificant effects.
Evolutionary Stability in the Intersection Game
Data preparation. The estimates of scale were the ordinary standard deviations of hand performance scores for the 12 groups together. The values were 5.295 for Round 1, 5.498 for Round 2, and 3.769 for Round 3. Location values were set to 0 for all rounds. The Time 1 performance was undefined for the first hand played by each group; therefore, the Time 1 performance for those hands was set equal to 0. The rationale is that, prior to the first experimental stimulus in a learning experiment, the base rate of a behavior would apply (Guastello, 1995) . Model extraction. The first set of models of Equation 5 type produced the results shown in Table 4 . Because of the substantial correlation between parameter estimates for 01 and 02, the weight 01 was dropped from the model. Parameter estimates for the Lyapunov exponents were statistically significant for.Rounds 1 and 2. Exponents were positive, indicating chaotic and expanding functions, which is the opposite of expectations from a learning curve. Dimensionalities ranged from 1.24 to 1.46. The second set of models of Equation 6 type produced higher R E coefficients for all three models. The Lyapunov exponents were negative, which was consistent with the expectations for a learning curve as specified in Hypothesis 4. Dimensionalities were higher, ranging from 1.62 to 1.78. The nonsignificant exponential coefficient for Round 2 suggested that function was linear, and its acquisition curve in Figure 1 shows a strong linear subcomponent. The alternative hypothesis, however, was a substantial , however, we used the models from Equation 6 for the simulations. We performed Round 3 of modeling to search for additional functions that were either not initially built into the model or that could have been statistically obscured by the primary function. Such functions were suspected because the acquisition functions for the 12 groups were shaped differently from each other. For this procedure, we calculated expected values of performance from the bifurcation-unknown functions and subtracted from the (z-transformed) performance measure. The same sets of models were calculated on these residuals. No significant effect was obtained for Round 1 (R2s were .01 and .00) or Round 2 (R2s were .01 and .02). A substantial effect was identified for Round 3, however, with an R 2 of .35. This was a simple exponential effect with a positive Lyapunov coefficient. There were, therefore, two functions taking place in Round 3, which was the most difficult round, signifying two processes taking place. One function was a learning curve, and the other was a chaotic expansion; these results thus supported Hypothesis 5.
Because the second function was based on a residual representing 86% of the original variance, the contribution of the second function accounted for 30% of the total variance. When this contribution was added to the initial 14%, the resulting total R 2 became .44. Dimensionality for this situation is simply the sum of the two contributing dimensionalities, or 3.11.
All three final R 2 coefficients for the nonlinear regression functions were greater than the benchmark value of .12 obtained earlier for the hand variable from the ANOVA. The ratios of R 2 coefficients represented 317% improvement in prediction for Round 1 using the nonlinear regression function, a 141% improvement for Round 2, and a 267% improvement for Round 3.
Simulations and Projections
The three final solutions were iterated forward in simulated time based on plausible initial conditions. Initial conditions were set at raw scores of 1, 4, and 9 performance points for all simulations. The Round 1 function was Equation 6 with the parameters listed in Table 4 . The three curves, shown in Figure 2 , converged to 1.83 moments after 11 iterations, or a raw performance score of 9.71. The maximum possible score was 16.
The Round 2 function reached asymptotic stability after seven iterations at 2.00 moments, or a raw performance score of 10.97, which was again less than the maximum possible value of 16. This was a bit higher than the Round 1 asymptote. This result was expected because the rule was of equal difficulty, and because the earlier ANOVA analysis showed a significant coordination-transfer effect.
The results for the iterations of the Round 3 functions were different. In the first scenario, the two functions were weighted 0.33:0.67 to reflect their weighting in the extraction analysis (Figure 3) . By the end of 12 iterations, all initial conditions reached a negative performance level of -0.012 moments, or a raw score of -0.04. Inasmuch as negative scores were not actually deliverable in the game, these results mean, in all likelihood, that the performance group became defunct after working on this difficult task after a while, even if there was some initial success. This is an extinction' process.
In the second scenario for Round 3, the two functions were equally weighted, 0.5:0.5. This weighting scheme might well be more robust in the long run than situationally specific weights (Wainer, 1976) . This time asymptotic stability was reached at a positive but low performance 2. 5 ................................................................................................................................................................................................ level of 0.16 moments, or a raw score of 0.61. Under these conditions the group continues to exist at a low level of output. A fourth initial condition, starting near zero, showed a performance increase to the same asymptotic level. The extinction of a group under these conditions would depend on whether environmental conditions, not manipulated here, would permit such a low productivity level.
Effect of Inflating the Performance Scale
The results for Round 3 obtained to this point suggested a new question that could be answered to some extent by further simulation work. Given that the task in Round 3 was more difficult than the earlier tasks, and the tendency for real people to give up when a task exceeds their capabilities, the next question was whether the potential for extinction could be countered by rewards comparable to the added difficulty.
The simulations for the functions extracted for Round 3 reported above used a weighted combination of the two functions, such that the sum of weights was equal to 1.0. Figure 4 shows the results for the functions weighted at 0.75:0.75 and 1:1, which results in a 150% and 200% inflation factor. The predicted value of performance then ranged from 0 to 32 in the 200% condition. Initial conditions corresponding to raw scores of 1, 4, and 9 were tested with the same result. At 150%, the asymptotic maximum was reached at 0.90 moments. At 200%, however, the predicted performance level skyrocketed beyond the bounds allowed in the game. Figure 5 illustrates the final step, which was to establish the critical value of the multiplier that separated the asymptotic iterated curves from the skyrocketing type. This time, functions were equally weighted to produce multipliers of 1.80, 1.85, 1.90, 1.93, 1.94, and 1.95. All trends were iterated using the same initial condition of 1.06 mo- 8 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................ 
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Iterations Figure 4 . Effect of applying a multiplier to the performance utilities in Round 3. Circles = utilities inflated to 150%; diamonds = 200%. ments. Results showed that the critical point was located between 1.94 and 1.95. For multipliers of 1.94 and below, asymptotic levels up to 2.00 moments were attained. These were not exactly asymptotic; they increased infinitesimally with successive iterations. For multipliers of 1.95 and above, predicted performance suddenly left the working performance range and headed beyond the bounds of the scale for the game. The skyrocketing effect took approximately twice as long to occur at 194% scaling than it did at 195%.
Discussion
The design and results of the experiment showed that team coordination was a distinct, identifiable, and learned process. The principles of the Intersection game were translated into the experimental game structure to produce a form of coordination that was characterized by three conditions. First, the group needed to correctly identify the coordination rule. Second, the group needed to correctly execute a sequence of acts. Third, the group's outcome was contingent on each group member making a timely execution of a contributing act.
Isolating Coordination
The group's performance in this situation required the group members to learn to coordinate with each other. The group learning was not verbally mediated, because verbal exchanges were not allowed during the game. Thus coordination learning is largely a nonverbal process. Future research, however, might explore the ways in which different types of verbal and nonverbal communication, other social forces, and individual differences (e.g., mental ability, personality, or social skills) could influence the process as well.
The performance of the experimental groups was unrelated to leadership presence or style, which was controlled for leadership influences in several ways. Group members had no prior history of working together. The experimenters did not designate leaders, nor was leadership mentioned in the course of the game instructions. Participants were seated in a square, with two on each side of a work table. Thus two situational factors that promote emergent leadership, talking a lot and sitting at the head of the table, were stifled.
On the other hand, real-world coordination situations involve leaders and verbal communication. Because coordination is an example of a self-organizing process, it appears the effective leadership in coordination situations would play the role of a catalyst. Such a catalyst would promote effective and relative communication, verbal or otherwise. A new role for leadership investigations is thus warranted.
We thought the coordination effect obtained in the experiment was unrelated to group cohesion for three reasons: The groups had no prior history, the task required the discovery of action sequences that were independent of cohesion effects, and extraneous social interaction did not occur because of the prohibition against talking. It is possible, however, that a degree of cohesion evolved throughout the course of playing three rounds of the game, although it was apparently not powerful enough to counteract the increased task difficulty in Round 3. Future research might assess the relationship between team cohesion and team coordination and the situational context where one, but not the other, might be promoted.
Transfer Effects
Positive transfer was strong when the stimuli, task difficulty, and reward structure were all the same from Round 1 to Round 2. Task difficulty had a significant negative effect on the level of learning transfer, however, to Round 3. It was not possible to predict in advance of the experiment the extent to which difficulty might influence coordination levels. Indeed there was an initial concern that the game rule would not be learned at all. Fortunately, the introduction of partial reinforcement (when only one game point was awarded) during the pilot study made a clear difference in whether the pilot group learned the rule or not. The joint effects of partial utilities, scaled utilities, and difficulty levels need to be explored further in future research.
Motivational Manipulation
The motivational manipulation had no effect on the performance of the teams. Observations of the games strongly suggested, however, that the participants were trying as hard as they could to learn the game rule in both conditions, and the additional manipulation of extrinsic rewards could not make them work any harder. Perhaps the potential for a few additional points toward the class grade was not a salient motivator. Different motivational manipulations should be considered in future coordination research.
NDS and Evolutionarily Stable States
NDS generated new theoretical connections between coordination acquisition and other forms of implicit learning. It was also useful for examining long-run potentials for group behavior that would have induced extraneous fatigue on human participants had they been subjected to hundreds of hands of play of the card game. Several key points emerged. First, it was possible to extract behavioracquisition curves that showed learning effects for coordination. Nonlinear regression was better suited to this purpose than ANOVA and trend analysis, although one helped to interpret the other. The basic ANOVA for the initial experimental design was still needed, however, to substantiate the key points that coordination was indeed learned by the group after controlling for alternative explanations and that the shifting of rules produced different levels of performance.
Second, nonlinear regression models based on dynamical theory nonetheless produced an improvement of more than 150% in the prediction of coordination learning compared with their general linear model counterparts. The underlying learning functions were illustrated in the simulations represented in Figure 2 . Up to 50% of the performance variance was accounted for by the nonlinear functions. Past research on group cohesion would add another 10-15% of performance variance. We suspect, however, that cohesion and coordination may be partially related or produce a favorable interaction effect. Future research might pursue this point.
Third, the shift to a more difficult coordination rule seemed to produce an extinction curve rather than a learning curve. Two dynamics were involved: a learning curve and a chaotic expansion. If, in the long run, both processes were taking place with equal likelihood, then extinction would not occur, but performance would be low. These outcomes were represented by the simulations in Figures  3 and 4 . Real-world constraints would determine if group survival with low output would be supported.
Fourth, a surprise resulted from the difficult shift situation when the performance utilities were inflated to a critical level. The utility multiplier of 1.94 had a dramatic effect on performance and the sudden onset of coordination. A slight increase in the multiplier to 1.95, however, shortened the time to sudden coordination by nearly half. Thus there was some true sensitivity to initial conditions taking place. This set of outcomes is illustrated in the simulation shown in Figure 5 .
Further simulation work should examine the contributions of random shocks together with the deterministic effects. In real terms, shock might consist of information about the performance of other groups, an interruption of the experiment with delays of varying time lengths, or noise that could disturb concentration. Because of the autoregressive character of the dynamical process, deviations introduced by shock are carded through to the subsequent time intervals. Thus, several repetitions of the scenarios with different shock regimes would not be expected to produce exactly the same results.
Limitations and Future Research
The sample size for this study, expressed in the number of groups, was relatively small. Brannick et al. (1993) noted that it is typically difficult to assemble groups of experimental participants in a large number of groups. The Intersection game required groups of 4 people, Whereas teams of 2 or 3 people are more common in experimental studies. Fortunately, the significant findings were clear and vibrant. The interaction effects would not have had a generalizable interpretation if they had been significant. Thus, statistical power was not judged to be a problem in the main experiment, The groups in the study did produce sufficient data for the analysis of nonlinear dynamics.
A different sort of limitation occurs in the interpretation of real phenomena in game-theory terms. An experimental game assumes that utilities are the same for every player and that all players make strictly rational 'decisions. These two assumptions are not necessarily met in real situations. The use of actual human participants and functions based on their data circumvent these problems to a greater extent than experiments based strictly on computer-generated numbers. Real situations may also involve multiple dynamics simultaneously. Games can contain subgames with different structures and utilities, players can form coalitions, and discussions among players can result in side payments, creative definitions of options, and alterations of perceived utilities. A host of experimental designs can be imagined.
Although the present study did isolate an elementary social process of coordination, real-world tasks often involve verbal exchanges, leadership, and hierarchies. Controlled experiments that assess the relative contributions of each are needed. For instance, one could ask whether the coordination demands for a situation require different leadership styles, whether leaders emerge because of their role in coordination facilitation, or whether appointed versus emergent leaders make a difference.
Finally, coordination in the Intersection model is a learned response, It appears to involve implicit learning especially, and it suggests a new range of studies for implicit learning. What is new here is that group members learn to work with each other, and each group member's output is an input for the other. This situation is different from the common learning situation where experimenters assume control of all relevant stimuli.
